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THE GENIE AND THE BOTTLE: COLLATERAL 
SOURCES UNDER THE SEPTEMBER llTH 
VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND 
Kenneth S. Abraham* 
Kyle D. Logue** 
INTRODUCTION 
The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 (the Fund) 
was part of legislation enacted just eleven days after the terrorist at­
tacks of September 11th in the wake of extraordinary national loss.1 It 
is possible, therefore, that the Fund will always be considered an ur­
gent and unique response to the unprecedented events of September 
11th. On that view, the character of the Fund will have little long­
term policy significance. It is equally possible, however, that the en­
actment of the Fund will prove to be a seminal moment in the history 
of tort and compensation law. The Fund adopts a new model for com­
pensating loss of life. This model will inevitably be invoked as a stan­
dard against which other approaches may be measured, and it may 
well be employed again in the event that we experience another major 
terrorist attack on American soil. Thus, with respect to this new 
model of compensation, there is a sense in which the genie may be out 
of the bottle: What the Fund did will have to be considered whenever 
new approaches to compensating personal injury and illness are 
contemplated. 
This prediction raises an obvious initial question: What about the 
Fund's approach to compensating losses is new? The answer depends 
on what the Fund is compared to. But regardless of the yardstick, the 
Fund breaks new ground. In one sense the Fund is unusually gener­
ous. For example, the Fund can be viewed as an innovative alterna­
tive to tort liability, analogous to workers' compensation or auto no­
fault insurance, that pays more generous benefits than these systems 
but (of course) to a more narrowly defined set of beneficiaries. Simi-
* Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of Law and Class of 1966 Research Professor, 
University of Virginia School of Law. 
** Professor of Law, University of Michigan School of Law. 
1. The Victims Compensation Fund was enacted as part of the U.S. Air Transportation and 
Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C.A 
§ 40101 (West 2003)) (hereinafter Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act]. 
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larly, the Fund can be seen as a new type of government�provided life 
insurance, along the lines of social security survivorship benefits, but 
again with more generous benefits and fewer beneficiaries. Under ei­
ther view, for those who happen to be beneficiaries of the Fund, from 
one standpoint they are treated extraordinarily generously. Indeed, 
for those who qualify for an award, the Fund comes closer to provid­
ing a full compensation measure of recovery than any non-tort com­
pensation regime ever adopted in this country. 
From another standpoint, however, the Fund is not only not gener­
ous, but stingy in a way that defies all precedent. Although the bene­
fits paid by the Fund exceed those available under existing non-tort 
compensation regimes, these benefits cannot compare to what one can 
obtain in a tort recovery, given the possibility of large noneconomic 
and punitive awards in some tort cases. But tort is universally under­
stood to be more generous in this respect than any of the vast array of 
available compensation alternatives. Therefore, a compensation alter­
native to tort, such as the Fund, cannot justifiably be accused of being 
parsimonious merely because it pays less than a successful tort claim­
ant would receive. 
But compared to other non-tort regimes, there is a sense in which 
the Fund is unusually stingy. The Fund contains a provision requiring 
that claimants' benefits be reduced by the amount of any compensa­
tion for September 11th-related-losses that the claimant has received 
or is entitled to receive from collateral sources, including life insur­
ance.2 Neither tort nor any significant non-tort source of compensa­
tion for lost life in this country requires a collateral offset for life 
insurance. Moreover, unlike most other types of insurance, which vir­
tually always employ some type of "coordination" or "other insur­
ance" clause to allocate an insured's losses among various insurers in 
situations in which the insured has multiple sources of coverage, life 
insurance never requires such an allocation.3 Instead, life insurance is 
paid on top of all other benefits. For this reason, the interaction be­
tween the collateral offset provision of the Fund and the provisions of 
standard life insurance policies is unique. Instead of victims' life in­
surance being paid to claimants on top of other benefits, the amount 
of life insurance received by claimants is deducted from the benefits 
paid to them by the Fund. 
2. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 405(b)(6), 49 U.S.C.A. § 40101 
(West 2003). For discussion of collateral sources, see Robert L. Rabin, Indeterminate Harm in 
the Context of September 11, 88 VA. L. REV. 1831, 1839-40 (2002). 
3. See ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 710, 737 (3d ed. 2002); Ros. 
ERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. Wrn1ss, INSURANCE LAW 227 (1988). 
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Although the treatment of collateral sources both within and 
outside of tort is generally an obscure subject, that treatment can have 
significant implications for distributive justice, corrective justice, and 
deterrence. The offsetting of Fund payments by life insurance recov­
eries appears to reflect a special sensitivity to avoiding double-or at 
least over-compensation of losses created by September 11th. But 
as we will attempt to explain, the Fund's treatment of collateral 
sources generally, and of l ife insurance in particular, strikes a balance 
among competing considerations that is far from simple. 
The salience of the events of September 11th has resulted in an un­
precedented amount of publicity about, and public attention to, the 
way in which victim recoveries are calculated under the Fund. Much, 
perhaps even most, of this publicity and attention have been focused 
on the treatment of collateral sources. Thus, a topic that until recently 
was obscure even for many tort scholars has become a matter of gen­
eral public debate. In this Article we explore the issues that have 
arisen out of the Fund's treatment of collateral sources and speculate 
about the significance of these issues for tort and compensation sys­
tems more generally. Our aim is not to resolve these issues, but to 
analyze them and identify their implications. In this sense this Article 
might be seen as a first step in the development of a broader theory of 
the proper treatment of collateral sources in any liability or compen­
sation system. 
II. BACKGROUND ON THE FUND 
A. The Forces in Play 
The Victim Compensation Fund was enacted at an extraordinary 
moment in this country's history. To understand how the Fund and its 
collateral offset provisions were intended to function, we must first 
understand the principal forces that lead to the enactment of the Fund 
and the U.S. Air Transportation and Safety and System Stabilization 
Act of which the Fund is one part. There appear to have been three 
major considerations that gave shape to this new type of compensa­
tion regime. 
1. Full Compensation 
In the immediate aftermath of September 11th there was an enor­
mous outpouring of public sympathy for the victims of the attacks and 
their families. They were perceived as having made a sacrifice for 
their country, rather than merely being the victims of a disaster. This 
perception was manifested in a desire to see the victims' families fully 
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compensated for the financial losses caused by the death of their loved 
ones, despite the potentially enormous cost of doing so. Evidence of 
this desire can be seen, among other things, in the unprecedented 
magnitude of the charitable response to September llth.4 Not only 
did the terrorist attacks give rise to the largest wave of charitable giv­
ing in modern U.S. history, it also became quite clear that the donors 
were intent on having their gifts go to the victims of the September 
11th attacks, even after organizations such as the Red Cross deter­
mined that those needs had already been met.5 This full compensation 
imperative was immediately influential in Congress. It is reflected in 
the rhetoric used by members of Congress during deliberations on the 
bill.6 And the Fund itself is responsive to this imperative. The Fund 
provides for the compensation of both economic and noneconomic 
losses and, as enacted, contains no limits on the total amount of com­
pensation that can be provided for either type of loss.7 
The extent to which this full-compensation imperative was opera­
tive also can be appreciated by comparing the benefits available from 
the Fund with those paid by other nontort compensation schemes. In 
virtually every other scheme the goal seems to be to provide not full 
compensation but only minimal welfare. For example, the death ben­
efit payable under a typical workers' compensation system is a maxi-
4. The American Red Cross's Liberty Disaster Relief Fund received roughly $1 billion in 
donations in the year following the attacks, approximately $800 million of which was expected to 
have been distributed by the end of 2002. Press Release, American Red Cross, American Red 
Cross Releases Sept. 11 Report (Sept. 5, 2002), available at http://www.redcross.org/press/dis 
aster/ds_pr/020905report.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2003). 
5. In October 2001, the Red Cross stopped seeking donations for September 11th victims, 
saying that it had received more money than it could use. See David B arstow & Katharine Q. 
Seelye, A Nation Challenged: The Charities; Red Cross Halts Collections for Terror Victims, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 31, 2001, at BlO; Corey Kilgannon, A Nation Challenged: Donations; Red Cross 
Offers to Refund Gifts for Sept. 11, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2001, at Bll .  
6 .  Representative James Turner (D-Tex.) made the following statement: 
Mr. Speaker, I want to address these remarks to the families of the victims, those who 
were injured on September 11 . 
One of the best provisions of this bill is that this Congress has provided a method 
whereby all those injured, the victims of those who have died, will have full recovery for 
their economic and noneconomic damages by the establishment of a special master. The 
Treasury of the United States has been opened by the Members of this Congress to ensure 
that every family will receive just recovery. It is one of the best provisions of the bill, 
and I urge my colleagues to support it. 
147 CoNG. REc. H5906 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001) (emphasis added). 
7. The regulations promulgated by the Special Master pursuant to the Act do place a pre­
sumed limit on the amount of noneconomic damages that may be recovered from the Fund, 
based on the number of dependent survivors of a victim. See 67 Fed. Reg. 11,239 (Mar. 13, 2002) 
(limiting compensation to $250,000 plus $50,000 for any spouse and each dependent). 
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mum of roughly $20,000 per year;8 under the Federal Black Lung Act 
that benefit is a maximum of about $12,000 per year;9 family members 
of military personnel killed in the line of duty receive $250,000;10 and 
the maximum survivor benefit under the Social Security program is a 
relatively small fraction of the deceased workers' average lifetime 
earnings.11 In short, as compared to the death benefits available 
under workers' compensation and federal compensation programs, 
the benefits payable by the Fund are extraordinarily generous. 
2. Tort Protection for the Airlines 
With the airlines facing possible bankruptcy in the aftermath of 
September 11th, they needed both financial backing from the govern­
ment and some degree of protection against tort liability for the al­
leged security failures that may have made the attacks possible. The 
Act gave them the former and the adoption of the Fund gave them the 
latter, though only indirectly. The indirect protection from tort liabil­
ity came by virtue of the Fund's largely successful effort to provide a 
nonmandatory, but generally acceptable, alternative to seeking com­
pensation through tort suits. 
Although the benefits available under the Fund are generous com­
pared to other non-tort compensation regimes, the amount of any 
8. The majority of states determine death benefits as a percentage of the deceased worker's 
average weekly wage. Most states have a maximum payment per week and a maximum period 
during which survivors may collect. 5 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON'S WORK­
ERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 98.02 (2002). For example, New York pays 66 2/3% of the em­
ployee's wage up to a maximum of $400 per week during the term of widowhood and to children 
until the age of eighteen. Florida pays 50% of the employee's wages to a spouse only or 66 2/3% 
of the employee's wages to a spouse and children up to a maximum of $594 per week. Idaho 
pays 45% to a spouse only or 60% to a spouse and children up to a maximum of $ 315.60 per 
week for up to 500 weeks. For a complete listing of state worker's compensation death benefits 
for surviving spouses and children see id. at app. B-65. 
9. The Black Lung Benefits Act, codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-962 (2000), provides "benefits, 
in cooperation with the States, to coal miners who are totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis 
and to the surviving dependents of miners whose death was due to such disease." 30 U.S.C. 
§ 901. Effective January 1, 2001, the basic monthly benefit for a totally disabled miner or his or 
her surviving spouse is $500.50. This may be increased to a maximum of $1001 per month for 
claimants with three or more dependents. Benefits are reduced by payments made for workers 
compensation. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT LAw GumE: BLACK LUNG COMPENSATION 
(2000), available at http://www.dol.gov/asp/programs/guide/blklung.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 
2003). 
10. See 38 U.S.C. § 1967 (2000). 
11. STAFF OF HousE CoMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 105TH CoNG., 2o SEss., 1998 GREEN BooK 
15 (Comm. Print 1998). For deceased workers with "average" or lower levels of qualifying 
wages, the income replacement rate provided by Social Security survivor benefits can be over 
50%, depending on how many dependents are left and how many years of Social Security wages 
the deceased had earned. For above-average wage earners, the replacement percentage is much 
lower. Id. 
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given claimant's benefits are nonetheless likely to be smaller than 
what could be obtained in a successful tort suit, in which huge non­
economic and punitive damages are at least potentially available. The 
difference, of course, is that recovery in tort is much less certain than 
obtaining benefits from the Fund. To secure a tort judgment, a plain­
tiff would need to identify and obtain jurisdiction over a defendant or 
defendants whose conduct, both factually and legally, satisfied the ele­
ments of a tort cause of action (duty, breach, causation, etc.) .  In con­
trast, the only serious question arising in a claim made by an eligible 
party against the Fund is the amount of economic damages suffered. 12 
Hence, discounting potential tort recovery for the possibility that the 
plaintiff might recover nothing, the benefits payable by the Fund seem 
at least comparable to tort, and probably a better bet for the risk ad­
verse claimant. 
This degree of comparability was politically necessary for two rea­
sons. First, any compensation system designed to be an alternative to 
tort is inevitably evaluated by reference to what is available in tort. 
Because the proposal was to make recovery from the Fund an alterna­
tive to tort at the option of the claimant, Congress could anticipate 
that the Fund's  benefit structure would necessarily ·be compared to 
tort damages. Consequently, Congress could not safely depart too 
radically from the tort benchmark. As so often happens, the nature of 
tort liability and the scope of the damages that are recoverable in tort 
tended to constrain what could be done in creating an alternative to 
tort. 13 Thus, Congress faced the challenge of fashioning a benefit 
structure that would be a departure from tort law's measure of dam­
ages but nonetheless would be judged in the public mind by reference 
to what the claimant could have obtained in tort. Nevertheless, by 
making recovery from the Fund automatic for any eligible party, and 
thereby eliminating much of the uncertainty inherent in bringing a 
tort claim, Congress left itself room to provide something less than 
"full" tort damages in return for relieving claimants of the burden of 
proving third-party wrongdoing in order to secure recovery. 
12. In some cases, however, this question may turn out to be very much in dispute. For exam­
ple, Cantor Fitzgerald, which occupied floors 101 through 105 of the north tower of the World 
Trade Center, lost 658 of its roughly 1,000 employees who worked in the building. See Submis­
sion of Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P., eSpeed, Inc., and Tradespark L.P. to the Special Master of the 
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 and to the Department of Justice 5 (Sept. 
12, 2002) available at http://www.cantorusa.com/vcf/DOJsubmission.pdf ( last visited Oct. 18, 
2003). The firm's brief argues that the Special Master's proposed approach to the compensation 
of economic loss threatens to undercompensate the families of deceased employees. 
13. See Walter Blum and Harry Kalvan, Jr., Ceilings, Costs and Compulsion in Auto Compen­
sation Legislation, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 341, 343 (1973). 
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Second, it was not only the reaction of the public at large with 
which Congress had to be concerned. The Fund also had to be attrac­
tive enough to the victims and their families that, at least prima facie, 
they would perceive it as providing an acceptable alternative to tort. 
Otherwise, potential claimants would have rejected the Fund alter­
native outright. Then the nation would have been faced with the 
prospect of an immediate cascade of lawsuits against American busi­
nesses-airlines, security companies, the World Trade Center design­
ers, and others-seeking to hold them liable for the results of 
September 1 1th. In the aftermath of September 11th that would have 
appeared unseemly and unpatriotic. The nation was in the process of 
pulling together to fight terrorism; the sort of recriminations within 
the "family" that would have been produced by lawsuits were to be 
avoided, if at all possible. The particular members of the family most 
in need of protection would seem to have been the airlines. Recall 
that the Fund was part of the Air Transportation and Safety and Sys­
tem Stabilization Act (the Act) , whose primary purpose, as its name 
suggests, was to shore up the airline industry, which was hit harder by 
the events of September 11th than any other single industry (perhaps 
including the insurance industry) . 14 The Fund held out the hope that 
the airline industry and the country would avoid the spectacle of tort 
litigation over the scope of American entities' responsibility for the 
attacks. 
3. Avoiding Overcompensation 
Another political factor that influenced the terms of the Fund was 
the desire to avoid overcompensation. There are two senses in which 
claimants could conceivably be overcompensated. First, the size of 
some individual awards might be seen as excessive. Because many of 
the victims earned sums in the top one-half to one percent of national 
income, if there was no ceiling on the amount that could be recovered 
from the Fund, or if the norm of full compensation were applied, the 
Fund would end up paying some truly extraordinary awards. This 
concern, however, appears not to have had much influence in the de­
sign of the Fund. In fact, no upper limit was imposed on the awards. 
14. In addition to creating the Fund, the Act, among other things, authorized the transfer of 
$5 billion in cash and $10 billion in loans to the airline industry. Also, it limited the airlines' tort 
damages from September 11th to the amount of their outstanding liability insurance coverage. 
See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, supra note 1, §408. A subsequent 
Act of Congress extended this liability limitation to any "aircraft manufacturer, airport sponsor, 
or person with a property interest in the World Trade Center, on September 11, 2001, whether 
fee simple, leasehold or easement, direct or indirect, or their directors, officers, employees, or 
agents." Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597, 646 ( 2001). 
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There was a suggestion that, in the implementation of the Fund, the 
Special Master might impose a "soft cap" on awards through a "pre­
sumed award" procedure. 15 As was made clear in the final regula­
tions, however, although there may be presumed awards, the Special 
Master does not intend to impose an absolute ceiling on awards, but 
plans instead to make awards based on the "individual circumstances 
of the claimant" -a plan that seems to imply an intention to ensure 
that there is full compensation. 16 
The risk of a second type of overcompensation, however, seems to 
have been more of a concern. Some Fund beneficiaries would also be 
receiving large life insurance or pension payouts triggered by the 
death of their loved ones. In such cases, if no offsets were made for 
these collateral sources of compensation, the total amounts received 
by those families could actually exceed the families' financial (though 
obviously not their nonfinancial) losses, or at least could involve very 
substantial sums. It is easy to imagine that lawmakers would have 
wanted to avoid the possibility that some families would become (or 
be perceived as becoming) wealthy as a result of the September 11th 
tragedy. This sort of concern is not unique to September 11th. Fed­
eral disaster relief generally, whether in the form of loans or outright 
grants, is available only for uninsured losses.17 The political reason 
for this limitation is clear: public support for disaster relief would 
wane quickly if there were stories in the media of victims actually 
profiting from a disastrous event. A desire to avoid this type of over­
compensation almost certainly contributed to Congress' s decision to 
insert the collateral offset provisions in the Fund. 
15. 67 Fed. Reg. 11,236-37 (Mar. 13, 2002). The presumed award is based on a formula that 
takes into account, among other things, the age and income of the victim. Under one of the two 
available claim "tracks," an e ligible claimant can seek a preliminary determination of her pre­
sumed award, which she can then either accept or reject, in favor of an individualized hearing. 
The notion of a soft cap arose from the fact that, according to the Special Master, the presumed­
award calculations would be made under an assumption that none of the September 11th victims 
had incomes higher than the ninety-eighth percentile of national income (around $225,000). This 
assumption is of course counterfactual in more than a few cases, as a sizeable number of victims 
had incomes in the top .5 to 1 % of national income. 
16. "To be absolutely clear: The fact that the 'presumed awards' address incomes only up to 
the [ninety-eighth] percentile does not indicate that awards from the Fund are 'capped' at that 
level. " Id. at 11,237. If this is so, however, one wonders why the Special Master bothered with 
the "presumed award" approach in the first place. Perhaps the idea is to encourage the use of 
the presumed awards in order to minimize the administrative costs of individualized hearings. 
But that story would seem to support the soft cap characterization. 
17. For example, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provides assistance 
for "uninsured or under-insured, necessary expenses and serious needs." 44 C.F. R. § 206.110 
(2002). Assistance to insured individuals and households is strictly limited. Id. § 206.113. 
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In sum, these three political considerations-full compensation, an 
attractive alternative to tort, and avoiding overcompensation-helped 
to shape the Fund as it was enacted by Congress, and as it was imple­
mented through the regulations promulgated by the Special Master. 
This is especially true of the collateral offset provisions, which we 
summarize in the next section, and then evaluate in the remainder of 
the Article. 
B. The Fund's Treatment of Collateral Offsets 
Although the language in the Act that sets up the Fund is relatively 
terse on the issue of collateral offsets, its meaning is unmistakable. 
Congress clearly intended to reverse the traditional treatment of col­
lateral sources, across the board. The Act provides that the Special 
Master awarding compensation "shall reduce the amount of compen­
sation . . .  by the amount of the collateral source compensation the 
claimant has received or is entitled to receive as a result of the terror­
ist-related aircraft crashes of September 11 ,  2001 .18 The term "collat­
eral source" is then defined to mean "all collateral sources, including 
life insurance, pension funds, death benefit programs, and payments 
by Federal, State, or local governments related to the terrorist-related 
aircraft crashes of September 11 ,  2001 ." 19 
This was among the most controversial provisions in the Act, and 
even the objections generated objections. Some commentators have 
railed against the collateral offset provision on the ground that it 
would mean that some families of September 11th victims would re­
ceive little, or perhaps nothing, from the Fund.20 That result struck 
many as especially unfair, given that the collateral offsets would have 
the greatest effect on the families of those victims who happened to 
have planned ahead (or whose employer planned ahead) and pur­
chased insurance, a group that included the families of the firefighters 
and police officers who died while attempting to rescue others. At the 
same time, however, some commentators have expressed serious con­
cern over the problem of overcompensation (discussed above) and, 
explicitly or implicitly, offered arguments in favor of the collateral off­
set provisions.2 1 
18. See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, supra note 1, § 405(b)(6). 
19. Id. § 402(4). 
20. See, e.g., David W. Chen, Worst-Hit Firm Faults Fairness of Sept. 11 Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
17, 2002, at Al ; Jon S. Corzine. Letter to the Editor, Fix the Victim's Fund, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 
2002, at A14; Elissa Goolman, Seeing Families, Senator Calls for Changes in Sept. 11 Fund, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2002, at B2. 
21. See, e.g., Robert F. Worth, Families of Victims Rally for Higher Federal Awards, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2002, at B4 (noting postings on the Victim Compensation Web site expressing 
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In his comments accompanying the final regulations implementing 
the Fund, the Special Master attempted to make clear that he was 
taking both of these competing concerns into account, though empha­
sizing that Congress had, in important respects, tied his hands by man­
dating collateral offsets.22 Thus, although Congress had listed several 
types of compensation that would have to be considered collateral 
sources-importantly, including life insurance proceeds-that list was 
not exclusive. As a result, the Special Master could be viewed as hav­
ing some discretion in defining what would count as a collateral source 
and what would not, how to calculate the value of the benefits payable 
by the collateral source, and under what circumstances the availability 
of payment from a collateral source would be considered too specula­
tive to be taken into account. 
The final regulations accepted the Congressional mandate every bit 
as far as it expressly extended but exempted from the category of 
"collateral source" a variety of payments or potential payments about 
which reasonable people might disagree. Thus, for example, the Spe­
cial Master defined the term collateral source not to include amounts 
received as charitable contributions, a decision that seems consistent 
with the statute but certainly was not required by it.23 In addition, he 
excluded from the definition certain tax benefits, such as the income 
and estate tax breaks made available to September 11th victims under 
the Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001 .2 4 Also, because the 
collateral benefits provided under the Social Security survivorship 
program as well as under some workers' compensation programs are 
contingent on future events, such as a surviving spouse's not remarry­
ing, the Special Master decided to require an offset only for those ben-
concerns about "greedy people when it comes to the distribution of funds to the victims of Sep­
tember 11"); Editorial, The Victims' New Referee, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2001, at A26 (suggesting 
that the Victim Compensation Fund could incorporate a "ceiling . . .  to prevent obscenely large 
awards. "). 
22. See September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,233 (Mar. 13, 
2002) (codified at 28 C.F. R. § 104 (2003)). The Special Master stated: 
Id. 
As I have repeatedly stated to the victims and their families, there are many aspects of 
the fund that are mandated by Congress and cannot be changed by me or by the De­
partment. Indeed, many of the most controversial aspects of the Fund-such as the 
requirement that awards be offset by life insurance and other collateral source compen­
sation-are specifically required by Congress. 
23. This decision may have been a response to the worry that firefighters and other rescue 
workers would otherwise receive too little compensation because the families of fallen rescue 
workers seem to have been the primary beneficiaries of charitable contributions. See Stephanie 
Strom, Survivors of Firefighters Ask to Look into Union Charity. N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2002, at B7. 
24. Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-134, 115 Stat. 2427. 
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efits that have already been received by the claimant.25 In addition, 
he made a decision not to include any element of personal savings as a 
collateral source, whether it be in the form of a savings or self-funded 
pension account or in the form of accumulated surrender value within 
a cash value life insurance policy.26 The unstated rational here seems 
to be that, at least with respect to the particular form of government­
provided life insurance represented by the September 11th Fund, indi­
viduals will not be expected to have self-insured.27 
This last exemption of various forms of savings and investment from 
the definition of collateral sources is of special significance, because 
the exemption highlights the difference between compensation based 
on loss and compensation based on need alone. As we will show be­
low, as far as the Fund does go in attempting to base compensation on 
loss, it stops short of basing compensation on need alone. In doing so, 
it avoids both the practical and the philosophical problems that would 
be entailed in prescribing means-tested recoveries. 
III. EVALUATING THE FUND'S COLLATERAL OFFSET PROVISION 
A. Coordination, Subrogation, and Collateral Sources 
In order to evaluate the Fund's collateral offset requirement, it is 
necessary to understand the two available approaches to handling col­
lateral sources in tort cases generally. The traditional approach, 
adopted by a majority of states, is to reject collateral offsets (this ap­
proach we call collateral nonoffsets); whereas a minority of states re­
quire collateral offsets of tort awards to take into account various 
types of non-tort compensation, not including life insurance.28 The 
choice between these approaches is intertwined with the doctrine of 
subrogation and the function this doctrine performs in coordinating 
sources of coverage in both insurance and tort law. 
1. Coordination of Insurance Coverage 
The entire coordination issue derives from the fact that private in­
surance products and social insurance regimes have proliferated in the 
modern American economy. Insurance is now available to cover a 
25. See September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,233, 11,241 (Mar. 
12, 2002) (codified at 28 C.F. R. § 104 (2003)). 
26. Id. at 11,234. He will also ensure that there are no offsets if those to whom life insurance 
or pensions are paid are not the parties receiving compensation from the Fund. Id. 
27. This may be another manifestation of the full-compensation norm discussed above, to 
which we will return later in the Article. 
28. As mentioned in the introduction, the Fund takes this minority collateral offset approach 
and, in an unprecedented move, expands it to offset life insurance proceeds as well. 
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variety of risks to health, life, property, and income. As a conse­
quence, there is an ever-increasing possibility of overlapping insur­
ance coverage for any given loss. First, different types of policies may 
overlap. For example, the medical costs associated with a personal 
injury may be covered under portions of an individual's  homeowner's 
policy, automobile policy, and employer-provided health insurance 
policy. Workers' compensation or Medicare may also figure into the 
equation. 29 Second, multiple policies of the same type may provide 
overlapping coverage. For example, two spouses and their family 
members may both be covered by health insurance afforded as a 
fringe benefit by their respective employers. In a very real sense, the 
Fund, too, is a source of first-party insurance that overlaps with bene­
fits paid to claimants by collateral sources. 
Despite these overlaps, providing policyholders with insurance in 
excess of their losses would violate the principle of indemnity, which 
holds that insurance is designed to protect against loss, not to make 
gain possible. This is a principle that runs through all of insurance 
law.30 To prevent payment in amounts that would violate this princi­
ple, a patchwork system of insurance coordination that allocates cov­
erage responsibility among potential insurers has evolved. Coverage 
is coordinated so as to specify which insurer or insurers pay, and in 
what proportions, when more than one policy provides coverage of a 
loss that does not exceed the sum of the coverage provided by all 
available policies. 
The goal of a system of coordination need not merely be to ensure 
that the principle of indemnity is not violated; coordination can per­
form other functions as well. From the standpoint of loss prevention, 
for example, primary coverage responsibility should be assigned to the 
insurer with the greatest capacity to combat moral hazard on the part 
of the insured. Alternatively, if moral hazard is of comparatively little 
concern (or if no insurer has much capacity to combat it), the insurer 
best situated to bear primary coverage responsibility may be the one 
most able to minimize administrative costs or to distribute the risk in 
question most broadly, depending on the system's goals. 
Our system of insurance coordination is implemented through a 
combination of market and legal mechanisms. 3 1 The market mecha­
nisms include insurance policy provisions expressly allocating insuring 
responsibility among insurers whose policies overlap. These provisions 
29. See id. at 133-34. 
30. Id. at 137; JERRY, supra note 3, at 295. 
31. See KENNETH s. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUB­
LIC POLICY 148 (1986). 
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are sometimes called "other-insurance" or "coordination of coverage" 
provisions. 32 Versions of them can be found in virtually every type of 
insurance policy, except, interestingly, life insurance. Coordination 
clauses of this sort attempt to specify which insurer or which policy is 
to be primary (that is, which will cover the first dollars of insured 
losses) and which will be secondary (which will cover what is left 
over). 
It is not uncommon, however, for such market mechanisms-con­
tractual coordination provisions-to fail by themselves to produce ef­
ficient or desirable risk allocation among the insurers in question. 3 3  
This i s  because it takes two to coordinate, so to speak. For example, 
market forces, if left alone, can lead to a situation in which two insur­
ance policies that purport to cover a given risk also contain "other­
insurance" clauses that, if read literally, result in no coverage 
whatever. That is, each policy has a clause making the other policy 
the primary insurer. 3 4  In such _situations courts are called upon to har­
monize conflicting coordination provisions, which sometimes means 
ignoring these provisions and specifying new rules of coordination. To 
avoid such conflicts altogether, regulatory authorities sometimes re­
quire insurers to insert standardized (and therefore consistent) coordi­
nation clauses in their policies. 
Thus far we have discussed coordination as if the only form of insur­
ance in play were first-party insurance-that is, insurance purchased 
by or for those who suffer loss themselves. A broader conception of 
coordination, however, would also comprehend third-party, or liabil­
ity insurance, as a source of coverage for such loss. The typical suc­
cessful tort claimant, after all, is likely to have received compensation 
for some of his or her losses from collateral sources, such as health 
and disability insurance, and yet, also to have a right of access to the 
tort defendant's liability insurance after settlement or judgment. The 
rules governing how the collateral sources will be counted-whether 
they will be offset against a tort award or not-can be understood as 
the means by which first-party and third-party insurance is 
coordinated. 
32. Id at 148-57. 
33. Id. at 157 ("Because market devices mainly make use of bilateral contracts to achieve 
coordination, their capacity to reflect the multi lateral character of the insurance arrangements 
they create is limited. "). . 
34. See, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc. v. Riverside Hosp., 703 P.2d 1384 (Kan. 
1985) (holding that coordination of coverage provisions in two health insurance policies were in 
conflict). 
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2. Subrogation as Coordination 
The doctrine of subrogation is  central to the way in which first-party 
and third-party insurance have traditionally been coordinated and the 
way in which the principle of indemnity has traditionally been served. 
Subrogation is the process by which one party is substituted for an­
other party relative to the latter's rights against a third party. Through 
subrogation, an insurer in effect "steps into the shoes" of the insured, 
succeeding to whatever legal claims that insured may have against 
third-parties responsible for the insured's  loss. 
The insurer in that case is said to be "subrogated to" the insured's 
rights to sue the third party. The authority for this transfer of rights is 
found either in an explicit subrogation clause in the insured's policy 
(which can be found in almost every first-party insurance policy, ex­
cept life insurance) or in the judicially created doctrine of equitable 
subrogation, which in effect makes a subrogation clause an implied 
term in virtually every type of non-life first-party insurance.35 
The traditional collateral source rule, which rejects collateral offsets 
and permits the plaintiff in a tort suit to recover compensation from 
the defendant for losses that have been or will be paid by collateral 
sources of insurance, is actually a method of vindicating first-party in­
surers' subrogation rights. That approach, among other things, is what 
the Fund rejected. To see how the traditional approach to collateral 
sources works, consider a simple example. Suppose that Sarah is in­
jured by Michael. Sarah's hospital and medical expenses may be paid 
by her first-party health insurer, such as B lueCross. If so, then, owing 
to either the subrogation language in Sarah's BlueCross policy or the 
state's  equitable subrogation doctrine, BlueCross will become subro­
gated to Sarah's tort rights against Michael to the extent of its prior 
payment to Sarah.36 BlueCross typically will not, however, exercise 
this subrogation right directly in an action against Michael. Rather, 
subrogation will occur indirectly, through the insurer's exercise of a 
right to subrogation via reimbursement by Sarah out of her recovery 
from Michael.37 
Thus, subrogation acts as a coordination device. However, instead 
of allocating insurance responsibility among first-party insurers, as 
35. See KENNETH s. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 192-93 (3d ed. 2000). 
36. Id. 
37. This ideal, however, is not always realized in practice. For example, insurers may not mon­
itor ongoing tort actions with sufficient care to vindicate their subrogation rights when actions 
settle or go to judgment; when cases settle, the amount of the insurer's right of reimbursement 
may be indeterminate. See KENNETH s. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 
216-18 (2d ed. 2002). 
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other-insurance clauses do, subrogation (working together with the 
collateral source rule) allocates coverage responsibility between first­
party insurers and tort defendants and their liability insurers. 
Through subrogation, the defendant or its liability insurer bears ulti­
mate coverage responsibility for the plaintiff's loss. That is why, 
under the traditional nonoffset collateral source rule, if an injured per­
son receives compensation from a source other than the tort defen­
dant (such as a first-party insurer), in a subsequent tort suit against the 
defendant the jury is not allowed to hear evidence on, or in any way 
take into account, the amount of this collateral compensation. 
That is also why the traditional collateral-nonoffset regime ideally 
has the effect of making the defendant or its liability insurance com­
pany the primary insurer of a plaintiff's medical expenses. However, 
when a defendant has no liability insurance or is judgment proof, the 
health insurer has no way to vindicate its subrogation rights and ends 
up bearing the cost of the policyholder/plaintiff's medical expenses as 
a kind of secondary insurer. In addition, many courts apply what is 
sometimes called a "make-whole" rule, under which an insurer cannot 
be subrogated to its insured's rights against a tortfeasor unless the in­
sured has been made whole.38 Under this rule, subrogation rights are 
limited when the insured has recovered or settled for less than his or 
her full losses. 
In contrast to the traditional nonoffset/subrogation approach, under 
a collateral offset rule of the sort adopted by statute in a number of 
states following the liability "crises" of the 1970's and 1980's-and like 
the approach adopted by the Fund-awards are in fact reduced by the 
amounts of first-party insurance proceeds already received or payable 
in the future.39 Under these statutes (as under the Fund), the plain­
tiff's total recovery from the defendant is offset by payments received 
or receivable from collateral sources. The collateral sources, in turn, 
typically have no subrogation rights to vindicate and are not reim­
bursed out of the plaintiff's recovery, which, after all, does not include 
the sums paid by collateral sources. Collateral sources such as health 
insurance (and in the case of the Fund, life insurance) thus become 
the primary course of compensation under a collateral offset regime. 
Under such a regime, if the medical expenses the plaintiff incurs ex­
ceed the limits of (or are not otherwise covered by) health insurance, 
or if the plaintiff incurs noneconomic losses, those losses are still cov-
38. See JERRY, supra note 3, at 711-14. See infra Part III.D.2. (further discussing the make­
whole issue). 
39. For discussion of these statutes, see Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, "Off to the Races:" The 
1980s Tort Crisis and the Law Reform Process, 27 Haus. L. REV. 207, 217-23 (1990). 
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ered by the plaintiff's "secondary" insurers-namely, the defendant 
and its liability insurer. 
Thus, the collateral nonoffset and collateral offset approaches each 
coordinate coverage and thereby prevent overcompensation, but they 
do so differently. The former allocates primary coverage responsibil­
ity to tortfeasors and their liability insurers. The latter allocates pri­
mary coverage responsibility to first-party insurers. The choice 
between the two approaches depends on which type of insurance one 
regards as more efficient or otherwise appropriate with respect to a 
particular type of risk. For instance, the efficiency question turns on 
which allocation of responsibility would provide the best overall risk­
reduction incentives (and thus would produce the least moral hazard) 
and which would provide the best means of risk spreading. The an­
swer to this question will often come down to one's views on the effec­
tiveness of the threat of tort liability in a given context as a deterrent. 
Thus, for example, the prospect of tort liability and its effects on auto­
liability insurance premiums probably has little effect on individual 
driving behavior. 40 Given the inherent risks associated with driving, 
and the potential incentive effect of first-party auto premiums, it 
seems unlikely that tort law significantly enhances safe-driving incen­
tives. If that intuition is sound, it would suggest that the optimal ap­
proach to collateral sources for auto-accident cases would be the non­
traditional collateral offset rule, which would leave auto risks to be 
insured by first-party insurers (and might even eliminate the need for 
costly tort suits) . 41 One might well have a different intuition as to the 
potential deterrent effect of product liability lawsuits, a conclusion 
that supports the traditional nonoffset approach to collateral sources. 
B. The Strange Case· of Life Insurance and 
the Principle of Indemnity 
To the extent that the Fund will operate as an insurance mechanism, 
it will function primarily as a form of life insurance. This is so because 
the vast majority of the payouts will be to the families of the almost 
3,000 victims who died in the attacks. However, whereas every other 
type of insurance includes an explicit (or judicially provided implicit) 
subrogation right or coordination provision, life insurance policies tra-
40. For discussion of the studies addressing this issue, see Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the 
Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L REV. 377, 393-97 
(1994). 
41. Indeed, this is a principal rationale for and effect of the move to auto no-fault compensa­
tion regimes in many states. 
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ditionally do not contain such provisions.42 Indeed, life insurance is 
the type of insurance with respect to which neither insurers, insureds, 
nor the law has sought to coordinate coverage so as to avoid overcom­
pensation. In the absence of an express subrogation provision in a life 
insurance policy, it is clear (though there is little law on the point) that 
the courts will not permit equitable subrogation by the insurer, as they 
would, for example, in the case of property insurance.43 And as a 
matter of practice, insurers never insert such clauses in their policies. 
The origins of this rule and the corresponding practice are not clear 
but may have originated from the (probably inaccurate) supposition 
that life insurance is not indemnity for lost income but a way of as­
suaging grief.44 Because the grief felt over the death of a loved one 
could never be fully assuaged, the theory went, a policyholder could 
not be overcompensated by recovery of both life insurance and a tort 
judgment.45 This theory was probably reinforced by the now-abol­
ished limitations on the scope of damages recoverable for wrongful 
death, including the non-recoverability under some statutes of any 
damages whatsoever for emotional loss.46 Once these limitations were 
in place, they were difficult to alter. To permit equitable subrogation 
by life insurers the courts would have been required to overrule long­
settled precedent. And any insurer that attempted to insert a subro­
gation provision in its policy would have found itself at a distinct pub­
lic relations disadvantage when it attempted to enforce the provision 
against, for example, a sympathetic widow. 
In any event, the general rule in tort law with respect to collateral 
sources from life insurance-even in the minority states that have 
adopted collateral offsets for most types of collateral sources-is that 
tort awards are not to be reduced by life insurance proceeds. Thus, 
using our example from above, if the accident involving Michael and 
Sarah had resulted in Sarah's death, then Sarah's family would have 
been able to recover not only the proceeds of her life insurance policy, 
42. See JERRY, supra note 3, at 710; KEETON & Wm1ss, supra note 3 at 227. 
43. See, e.g. , Spencer L. Kimball & Don A. Davis, The Extension of Insurance Subrogation, 60 
M1cH. L. REV. 841, 845 (1962) ("In life insurance, there seems little doubt that, absent contrac­
tual stipulation, subrogation would be denied uniformly. Dicta are plentiful, but no cases actu­
ally decide the matter. "). 
44. See, e.g., George Steven Swan, Subrogation in Life Insurance: Now Is the Time, 48 INs. 
COUNS. J. 634, 635 (1981). 
45. See, e.g., Mich. Hosp. Serv. v. Sharpe, 63 N.W.2d 638, 644 (Mich. 1955) (Reid, J., dissent­
ing) ("There seems to be little doubt that a life insurance company cannot recover of one who 
has caused the death of an insured the amount which it has thereby been compelled to pay. ") 
(quoting 29 AM. JuR. 1003-04) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Kimball & Da­
vis, supra note 43, at 851. 
46. Kimball & Davis, supra note 43, at 859. 
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assuming she had such a policy, but could also have brought a wrong­
ful death claim against Michael without any offset for the life insur­
ance proceeds. 47 As a result, depending on a number of factors­
including Sarah's income, the amount of her life insurance, her rela­
tionship with her dependents, and the amount of the wrongful death 
recovery-Sarah's family might have been, in a purely financial sense, 
"overcompensated" for Sarah's death. 
Of course, to say that life insurance, as it is used today, is not about 
indemnity is to indulge in a fiction. When a household decides to 
purchase life insurance on the lives of the income earner or earners in 
the household, the whole point is to insure the dependents (for exam­
ple, the surviving spouse and any young children in the household) 
against the possibility that earning power will be prematurely lost. 
"Premature death" in the life insurance context means dying before 
the time at which the dependents either would be expected to fend for 
themselves or would have sufficient savings built up to replace the 
earning power of the deceased breadwinner. Put this way, in terms of 
insuring earning power or human capital, life insurance begins to look 
a lot like disability or even property insurance, and the indemnity con­
cept seems at least arguably relevant. 
Moreover, one of the most important manifestations of the princi­
ple of indemnity-the insurable interest requirement-does in fact 
apply to life insurance. This doctrine holds that individuals may 
purchase coverage only against contingencies that will actually cause 
them to suffer a loss and only to the extent of those potential losses. 48 
The obvious reason for having an insurable interest requirement in 
life insurance is essentially the same as in other types of insurance. 
47. See, e.g., McKinney v. Cal. Portland Cement Co., 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 849 (Ct. App. 2002); 
B ell v. Estate of Bell, 885 S.W.2d 877 (Ark. 1994); Estate of Rattenni v. Grainger, 379 S.E .2d 890 
(S.C. 1989); RONALD HORN, SUBROGATION IN INSURANCE THEORY AND PRACTICE 39 (1964). 
48. JERRY, supra note 3, at 296-310. The rules governing what precisely constitutes an insura­
ble interest (such as whether there must be a "legal interest,"-a contract right, in the item 
insured-or whether, instead, a "factual expectancy" of some return from the insured item is 
sufficient) vary from state to state. Id. The insurable interest requirement is essentially the same 
for both property and life insurance, with a number of key qualifications. Id. at 310-16. For 
example, with life insurance taken out on one's own life, or on the life of a close family member, 
there generally is no doctrinal limit on the amount of coverage that can be purchased. This is in  
contrast to  property insurance, where the insurable interest doctrine limits coverage to the 
amount of one's economic interest in the property being insured. However, with life insurance 
contracts, insurers themselves impose limits on the amount of coverage they will provide. Thus, 
we would be surprised if a life insurer would be willing to sell a policy on an individual's life that 
greatly exceeded a reasonable estimate of that individual's human capital value. What is impor­
tant for the purposes of this Article is that insurance law-for both life insurance and property 
insurance-generally seeks to avoid circumstances in which losses to life or property result in 
windfall gains to insureds. 
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The requirement seeks to minimize the especially egregious form of 
moral hazard that would arise if individuals were permitted to 
purchase life insurance policies that could generate net economic gain 
for them.49 
For all these reasons, and contrary to conventional wisdom, there is 
a sense in which the principle of indemnity does in fact apply to life 
insurance. Nevertheless, the doctrine of subrogation clearly does not. 
With the liberalization of wrongful death statutes to permit recovery 
of emotional losses suffered by survivors, we must ask why. Perhaps 
the best explanation is still that nonsubrogation is necessary to com­
pensate for the problem of underinsurance. That is, a case can be 
made that individuals and households generally buy too little life in­
surance.50 Although there is a conceptual and normative difficulty in 
determining precisely what the "right amount" of life insurance is (an 
observation that will become important below in our evaluation of the 
Fund), there is substantial empirical evidence to support the claim 
that the lives of primary earners within households tend to be under­
insured.51 Moreover, there are cognitive reasons why we might expect 
this to be so-simple myopia, an unwillingness to face one's mortality, 
distaste for dealing with life insurance agents, and even fear of having 
one's blood drawn during a physical exam. 
If most households have too little life insurance, then also allowing 
them to bring wrongful death actions without having to share the pro­
ceeds with a life insurer will, to some extent, counteract this underin­
surance problem. The approach achieves this effect, however, in a 
way that is sometimes underinclusive and sometimes overinclusive. It 
is underinclusive in that many households that are underinsured do 
not have the benefit of a wrongful death claim; and it is overinclusive 
in that some households that do have such claims will not have been 
49. There is also a low-level anti-wagering concern here that is separate from the moral haz­
ard concern. Although we are generally skeptical of anti-wagering justifications for the principle 
of indemnity and the insurable interest requirement (given that many states allow various types 
of gambling and some even have state run lotteries), there would undoubtedly be something 
untoward about allowing individuals to bet on when someone in whose life they have no per­
sonal or economic interest will die. 
50. Kyle D. Logue, The Current Life Insurance Crisis: How the Law Should Respond, 32 
CUMB. L. REV. 1 (2001). 
51. B. DOUGLAS BERNHEIM ET AL., THE ADEQUACY OF LIFE INSURANCE: EVIDENCE FROM 
THE HEALTH AND RETIREMENT SuRVEY (Nat'! B ureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
7372, 1999), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7372 (last visited Oct. 18. 2003). Accord­
ing to this study, if their spouses died in 1992, almost one-third of wives and more than 10% of 
husbands would have suffered living standard reductions of 20% or more. Id. at 3. The authors 
also found that underinsurance tends to be more common among low-income households, 
couples with asymmetric earnings, younger households, couples with dependent children, and 
non-whites. Among some groups, the frequency of underinsurance exceeds two-thirds. Id. 
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underinsured. In these latter situations there is, at least theoretically, 
a moral hazard and the corresponding problem of wagering on death. 
Thus, there is a tradeoff between the problem of the overinsured and 
the problem of the underinsured, although we suspect that the latter is 
of greater concern than the former. Perhaps the biggest weakness 
with the argument that seeks to justify double-indemnity for wrongful 
death on grounds of underinvestment in life insurance generally is 
that there are any number of policy tools that might more effectively 
respond to the problem. For example, instead of allowing double re­
covery for certain tort plaintiffs, Congress might enact a new tax 
break for all who purchase life insurance or for those in the categories 
of people whom we believe to be most at risk. In the extreme, Con­
gress might even increase the amount of government-provided life in­
surance offered through the Social Security Survivorship program.52 
Any such approach could be made both more precise and more com­
prehensive than simply allowing double-recovery for those whose 
loved one happens to have been killed by a negligent tortfeasor. 
In sum, we do not necessarily defend the traditional collateral-non­
offset/nonsubrogation approach to wrongful death claims and life in­
surance proceeds. Indeed, a consistent recognition that life insurance 
is primarily about indemnity for lost earning power would suggest ei­
ther a nonoffset/subrogation approach or a collateral-offset approach. 
However, we can at least see what the argument for the offset/subro­
gation approach is-one based on a claim of underinsurance. What 
we argue in the next section is that such an argument would have no 
application in the September 11th setting and, therefore, to allow the 
double-recovery approach would clearly have been a bad idea. Thus, 
the central question for the design of the Fund's collateral source rules 
becomes this: Which approach to preventing double-recovery makes 
the most sense? Is it a collateral-nonoffset/subrogation approach, 
which is traditional for most tort claims but would be radical and un­
precedented for wrongful death cases? Or is it the collateral-offset/ 
nonsubrogation approach, which the Fund adopted and which also is 
unprecedented for wrongful death cases and life insurance proceeds? 
C. The September 11th Fund as Life Insurance and the 
Collateral-Nonoffset Alternative 
1. The Irrelevance of Underinsurance 
If there is a case for allowing some degree of double-recovery in the 
typical wrongful death tort action on the grounds of systematic under-
52. See Logue, supra note 50, at 37-61. 
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investment in life insurance, that argument, such as it is, would not 
apply to the Fund. This is not because every individual who died in 
the September 11th attacks had adequate life insurance. To the con­
trary, many almost certainly did not. If the conclusions of recent re­
search on life insurance coverage holds true, then many of the 
younger heads of households who died in the attacks had too little life 
insurance, or none at all.53 Rather, the point here is that payouts 
under the Fund are so generous that there will not likely be a wide­
spread problem of undercompensation for September 11th caused 
deaths. To put the point more directly, except in cases of victims at 
the very highest income levels, the Fund payouts will come close to 
providing full compensation for lost income due to September 11th 
caused deaths, although obviously no human life can ever be replaced 
with money. Moreover, the per-person level of (in effect) govern­
ment-provided life insurance provided by the Fund is much greater 
than the amount that most individuals carry on their lives. For this 
reason, it did make sense for Congress either to include in the Fund a 
collateral-offset provision of the sort that was included or not to in­
clude such a provision but to grant life insurers (and other collateral 
sources) a subrogation right against Fund payouts. In theory, either 
approach could lead to full compensation while preventing double in­
demnity. The interesting question is which approach is better. That is 
the question to which we now turn. 
2. The Irrelevance of Deterrence 
First, let us do away with one argument that generally favors the 
collateral-offset approach, which again is the majority rule for most 
tort claims. Recall that the cost-internalization benefit of tort law de­
pends on the coordination provided by collateral-nonoffsets and sub­
rogation. Only with a system of nonoffsets and subrogation can the 
injury costs ultimately be shifted to tortfeasors and their liability in­
surers through the tort system, which in turn leads (in theory) to opti­
mal investments in accident avoidance. It is this promised benefit of 
tort-induced deterrence that is typically cited as the justification for 
the large administrative cost differential between the tort system and 
a no-fault system of insurance. If, for whatever reason, there is no 
deterrence benefit from this cost-shifting, then the administrative 
costs of the tort system are not justified, at least not on deterrence 
grounds. Again, this is the primary argument that has been made in 
53. See BERNHEIM ET AL, supra note 51. 
612 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:591 
favor of the switch from a fault-based to a no-fault auto-insurance 
regime. 
With this argument in mind, the question arises whether there is any 
deterrence benefit to be gained in the September 11th context by a 
cost-shifting from first-party life insurers to the federal government, as 
a collateral non-offset approach would do. And the answer is almost 
certainly no. In the September 11th setting, deterrence through tort 
law seems largely irrelevant. The institution that has been made fi­
nancially responsible for the September 11th deaths-the United 
States government-is not a tortfeasor in the class of those who can 
be deterred in the future by tort law. The government is a third-party 
that already, without any inducement from tort law, has every incen­
tive to prevent such attacks in the future. (Witness the amount of 
federal tax dollars already being spent on reducing the risk of terrorist 
attacks.)  Rather, the situation here-involving private life insurers of 
various sorts and the federal government as life insurer-bears a 
much closer resemblance to a traditional first-party insurance coordi­
nation problem (as in the case of first-party health or disability insur­
ance policies) than to a subrogation problem. Hence, the issue is 
whether private life insurance companies should be the primary insur­
ers, with the federal government secondary, or vice versa. That is, 
there is no deterrence rational for choosing one over the other, espe­
cially insofar as the collateral-nonoffset alternative would likely have 
entailed higher overall administrative costs.54 
3. The Distributional Question: Who Should Bear the Losses­
Life Insurers or Taxpayers? 
The most important question in deciding between the offset and 
non-offset approaches is one of distributional justice: To what extent 
should the financial losses produced by the deaths of nearly 3 ,000 peo­
ple on September 1 1th be borne by private insurance companies, their 
shareholders, and perhaps their reinsurers; and to what extent should 
those losses be borne by the United States government, that is, the 
United States taxpayer? Again, because of the generosity of the Fund 
payouts (owing to the full compensation norm discussed above), and 
54. The higher administrative costs would have come from the need for a process by which life 
insurers would have sought subrogation payments from the federal government. If we assume a 
no-fault regime (again, because of the absence of any deterrence goal), then such a subrogation 
process could have been relatively inexpensive, that is, in comparison with a typical tort suit 
against a private party. However, it seems likely that such a process would be less efficient than 
simply having the Special Master do the collateral offset determination as part of his overall 
decision about the size of the award. Certainly there is no compelling administrative-cost sav­
ings from the non-offset approach. 
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because of the likely underinsurance problem among the victims of 
the attacks, taxpayers would bear some of this burden under either 
regime; however, the nonoffset/subrogation approach would have 
greatly increased this drain on federal tax dollars and would have es­
sentially eliminated the September 11th liability of life insurers. The 
argument for such an approach would go something like this: The 
September 11th attack was directed at the entire country and not just 
New York City, or just a group of individuals in New York City-and 
certainly not at the particular insurance companies who end up bear­
ing most of the costs under the collateral offset approach. Thus, the 
argument concludes, compensation for September 11th related losses 
should be funded as broadly as possible across the United States 
population. 
We would reject this argument for two reasons. First, and very sim­
ply, the collateral offset approach, in contrast with the nonoffset/sub­
rogation approach, is consistent with contractual obligations assumed 
by the insurance companies when they sold life insurance policies to 
the victims of September 11th and their families. Each of those poli­
cies, like all life insurance policies, almost certainly contained a prom­
ise to pay a given death benefit in the event of the insured's death 
(upon the presentation of a death certificate) whatever the cause. That 
is to say, life insurance policies, unlike' many other types of insurance 
policies, contain very few exclusions. So long as the incontestability 
period (almost always two years) has passed and the insured does not 
die by suicide within a given period after the issuance of the policy, 
the death benefit will be paid. There are no questions having to do 
with the number of "occurrences"55 or, typically, whether the loss oc­
curred during a "warlike action by a military force,"56 as there might 
be for property insurance. Thus, we suspect that there have been very 
few, if any, attempts by insurance companies to deny death claims 
arising out of September 11th, except in the cases of fraud-for exam­
ple, when an individual falsely claims to have lost a loved one in the 
attacks or falsely claims that a lost loved one was insured. Besides 
those cases of fraud, insurers are almost certainly paying the claims 
with no objections, both for contractual reasons and for public rela­
tions reasons.57 And this is as it should be: the collateral offset ap-
55. See SR Int'! B us. Ins. Co. v. World Trade Ctr. Props., No. 01 Civ. 9291, 2002 WL1163577, 
at el (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2003) (addressing whether attack(s) on the World Trade Center consti­
tuted one or two "occurrences" for purposes of construing property insurance policies.). 
56. See JERRY, supra note 3, at 1068-69 (discussing wartime exclusion and its application to 
September 11th). 
57. Additionally, even the fraud defenses to coverage will be lost once the incontestability 
period has elapsed. 
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proach-which makes the life insurers the primary insurers of the 
human capital lost on September 11th-gives the life insurers pre­
cisely the benefit of their bargain. To go with the nonoffset/subroga­
tion alternative would have amounted to having the American 
taxpayer pick up a debt that rightly belongs to the life insurance 
industry. 
Second, if we were to decide that the cost of September 11th caused 
deaths should be borne by taxpayers generally (perhaps because of 
the notion that the attacks were directed at the nation as a whole), a 
much more radical departure from past insurance practice would be 
called for than merely adopting a nonoffset/subrogation approach to 
collateral sources. If Congress were to take such an argument seri­
ously, the same rationale would apply to property losses. Those 
losses, in monetary terms only, dwarfed the losses to human capital 
associated with the September 11th attack. Thus, a move to truly "na­
tionalize" the cost of September 11th and take it off the backs of the 
insurers would have required a much more radical (and massively 
more expensive) program than was adopted.58 The case for national­
izing even more of September 11th losses than was in fact nationalized 
seems difficult to make, given all of the many risks that we generally 
leave for private markets to distribute. This conclusion holds despite 
the fact that there have been reports of shortages of (or dramatically 
increased prices for) insurance coverage for terrorism-related losses, 
including life insurance.59 If the history of the insurance industry is 
any indication, however, over the long run, as capital returns to the 
reinsurance market and the hysteria from September 11th subsides, 
the problems of insurance capacity for life insurance will subside as 
well. In any event, unless one can tell a compelling market-failure 
story concerning the market for life insurance for terrorism-related 
risks (which we doubt), special government intervention-in this case 
in the form of making the federal government the primary insurer of 
terrorism-caused loss of life (which is what a subrogation approach 
58. Most of the losses to property resulting from September 11th are expected to be covered 
by private insurance, and what government relief will be provided-which will not be insubstan­
tial is explicitly limited to those losses not covered by private insurance. Saul Levmore & Kyle 
Logue, Insuring Against Terrorism-and Crime, M1ctt. L. REv. (forthcoming 2003) (discussing 
relationships between private insurance, charitable relief, and government relief for September 
11th losses to property and life) . 
59. See id. at text accompanying notes 20-21.  There is some anecdotal evidence that reinsurers 
are demanding that group life insurers either pay dramatically higher reinsurance premiums or 
else include terrorism exclusions in their policies. Diane Levick, Life Insurers Want Safety Net, 
HARTFORD CouRANT, Mar. 22, 2002, at El, available at 2002 WL 4798280. 
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would in essence have done)-does not seem warranted.60 A thor­
ough treatment of this question-of the appropriate degree of nation­
alization of particular risks-is well beyond the scope of this Article. 
We raise it here only to point out that, whatever the merits of the case 
for such a nationalization of risk, it would be odd in the extreme to 
choose only to nationalize the risk that had been contractually as­
sumed by the life insurance industry. 
D. Defining Collateral Sources 
Besides the questions (a) whether to allow double-indemnity for 
loss of life (as the common law does in wrongful death cases, but the 
Fund opted-for good reason-not to), and (b) which approach-col­
lateral offsets or nonoffsets-plus-subrogation-is the best means of 
avoiding double-indemnity, there remains the conceptually difficult 
and morally fraught task of defining what counts as a collateral 
source. Part of the job was done by Congress and part was left to the 
discretion of the Special Master. Congress specifically said that "all 
collateral sources" would be offset from the September 1 1th payouts, 
and then it listed some of the most obvious categories of collateral 
sources, including "life insurance, pension funds, death benefit pro­
grams, and payments by Federal, State, or local governments related 
to the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11 ,  2001."61 
However, it was clear that Congress did not mean for this list to be 
exhaustive. In the following sections we discuss some of the difficult 
theoretical and practical issues raised in defining collateral sources. 
1. Collateral Sources and Savings: A Compensation-Based 
Approach vs. a Need-Based Approach 
The Special Master has attempted to draw a clear line between any 
payment that looks like pure life insurance-compensation for lost 
human capital-which will be considered a collateral source, and any 
payment that looks like a withdrawal from savings, which will not be 
considered a collateral source and, hence, will not be offset against 
Fund payouts. This distinction is easy to draw in most cases. The pro­
ceeds of a term life insurance policy are clearly a collateral source; 
whereas, a personal savings account is clearly not a collateral source 
under the Special Master's conception. 
60. Fe: ::;; c;,;:cnJcJ Ji,rnssion oi the arguments for and against government intervention in 
the terrorism-risk insurance market, see generally Levmore & Logue, supra note 58, at text 
accompanying notes 51-63. 
61. Air Transportation and System Safety Stabilization Act, supra note 1, § 401(4). 
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Drawing lines between savings and insurance, however, is not al­
ways so straightforward. For example, it will be somewhat more diffi­
cult to determine what portion of a death benefit from a cash value 
policy is pure insurance and what portion is return of capital. A simi­
lar distinction will have to be made with respect to certain types of 
pension funds. Consistent with the savings and insurance distinction, 
the Special Master has said that defined contribution plans such as 
401(k) plans-in effect vested savings accounts that can only be 
reached (without penalty) upon retirement-are to be treated as sav­
ings. However, to the extent such retirement plans contain an ele­
ment of pure term insurance, as some retirement plans do, that 
amount must presumably be offset. Distinguishing between the por­
tion of pensions that is insurance and the portion that is savings can be 
difficult. 
Similar measurement problems could arise insofar as September 
11th victims have various forms of non-traditional life insurance. For 
example, some individuals purchase life insurance that pays off their 
mortgage in the event of their death. Presumably such payments 
would be treated as life insurance offsets as well. A more difficult 
line-drawing question is presented by those victims who owned some 
form of double-indemnity life insurance, which pays double the nor­
mal death benefit if the insured dies as a result of a specific listed 
cause, such as an accident. Should such benefits be considered collat­
eral source offsets, or only the part necessary to replace the individ­
ual's earning power? Probably the former, but the answer is not 
obvious. 
All of these questions raise a more general issue regarding the Spe­
cial Master's decision to draw a line between insurance and savings. 
Putting aside measurement or line-drawing problems, why is it obvi­
ous that such a distinction should be drawn? Why should collateral 
source offsets include insurance and government benefits and other 
forms of "compensation" for a given loss but not savings or wealth? 
And the same questions could be applied not only to the Fund but 
also to those tort jurisdictions that have adopted the collateral offset 
approach. Ultimately, we conclude that offsets for savings would 
probably not be a good idea-either in the Fund context or in the tort 
context-but in this section we argue that the case against such offsets 
for savings or wealth is not as open-and-shut as one might think.62 
62. The arguments in this section could also be applied to the Special Master's decision not to 
include charity as a collateral source. 
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In the tort setting the case against collateral offsets for personal sav­
ings or wealth might begin something like this: It has long been con­
sidered fundamental to the conception of tort law that tort damage 
awards approximate the harm caused to the plaintiff by the defen­
dant.63 Thus, whether one subscribes to a corrective justice view of 
tort law (in which tort law is understood as correcting wrongful 
harms) or a deterrence view (in which tort law is intended primarily to 
internalize costs and minimize the costs of accidents) , damage awards 
are supposed to equal the harm caused. Most tort theorists would 
agree that it is inappropriate to adjust tort awards based on the in­
jured plaintiff's savings or wealth except insofar as such an adjustment 
is necessary to measure the actual amount of the loss sustained. 
Moreover, if we were to begin treating various forms of wealth as col­
lateral offsets in tort cases, such a move would radically transform the 
tort system. 
This conclusion, however, is usually reached in discussions of the 
role of distributive justice in traditional tort law, by which we mean a 
tort regime in which collateral sources are not offset-in which the 
traditional collateral source rule applies. It is with respect to those 
majority jurisdictions that deterrence and corrective justice are 
thought to be the leading (albeit competing) justifications of the tort 
system. To reduce or offset tort awards in those jurisdictions to ac­
count for the wealth of the plaintiff would indeed work a radical trans­
formation of tort law, from a system of corrective justice or deterrence 
to one of wealth redistribution, which very few commentators (includ­
ing us) would regard as advisable. But we are not talking about a tort 
regime in which there are generally no collateral offsets; rather, we 
are talking about jurisdictions (including the Fund) that, in an effort 
to avoid overcompensation or "double-recovery," have already de­
cided to adopt some collateral offsets-to depart from the traditional 
collateral source rule. The only remaining question, and the one that 
we focus on here, is whether to include offsets for savings or wealth 
along with the other offsets. 
Given the way we have framed the question, it is less clear, at least 
on deterrence and corrective-justice grounds, what is wrong with 
wealth offsets in tort law, which no more undermine the deterrence 
and corrective-justice functions of tort law than do any other collat­
eral offsets. As already discussed, collateral nonoffsets, together with 
the subrogation principle, are essential to tort law's rleterrence func 
tion ot shifting the costs of accidents from victims to injurers and their 
63. This conclusion ignores arguments for the imposition of punitive damages. 
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liability insurers, at least in circumstances in which first-party insur­
ance is present.64 A similar point could be made about the corrective 
justice goal of tort law. Thus, the objective of maintaining the purity 
of the deterrence or corrective justice functions of tort law would have 
little purchase as an argument against wealth offsets. And the same 
could be said of deterrence-based or corrective-justice based objec­
tions to wealth offsets in the Fund context: That we are allowing col­
lateral offsets at all suggests that deterrence and corrective justice are 
not the goals of the Fund. 
This conclusion seems right to us. As discussed above, the deter­
rence justification for tort law does not seem to apply to the Fund, as 
there is little reason to think of the Fund as a deterrent against future 
terrorism. Moreover, although one might plausibly argue that the 
Fund serves a corrective justice goal, if one takes the view that the 
federal government was morally culpable for the September 11th at­
tacks, such a vision of the Fund does not fit well with its actual design, 
which offers no opportunity for fact-finding as to the culpability of the 
government (as a tort suit would allow with respect to a tort defen­
dant), but rather focuses only on the questions (a) whether the claim­
ant qualifies for a payment from the Fund, and (b) what the amount 
of that payment ought to be. 
But if deterrence and corrective justice are not the point of the 
Fund-as they appear not to be the main point of tort law in collateral 
non-offset jurisdictions,65-what is the point? Presumably, it is simply 
compensation. But what does that mean? Are we to view the Fund as 
a substitute for, or an enhancement of, the level of life insurance that 
rational well-informed individuals would purchase for themselves or 
their households? On this view, the design of the Fund generally, and 
the design of the collateral source offsets specifically, should be evalu­
ated on the basis of their correspondence with that hypothetical level 
of life insurance. This application of the consumer sovereignty norm, 
borrowed from the fields of contracts law and products liability law, 
might be said to embody a "compensation-based" or "insurance-
64. As far as we know, none of the jurisdictions that have adopted a collateral offset approach 
have included savings or wealth in their definition of collateral sources. Rather, they limit the 
collateral offsets, as Congress has done in the Fund context, to payments that compensate di­
rectly for (or "indemnify") the loss in question, such as insurance benefits or special government 
benefits. The reason for this may simply be that those jurisdictions simply do not want to take 
on the additional administrative headache of determining what counts as savings and what does 
not, and how much of savings gets offset. 
65. We are not saying that in collateral-offset jurisdictions tort law serves no deterrence or 
corrective-justice goals, only that deterrence and corrective-justice in such jurisdictions are less 
important than in traditional collateral non-offset jurisdictions. We return to this qualification in 
Part IV of this Article. 
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based" view of how the Fund awards should be calculated.66 On this 
view, full compensation calls for the level of payment that an individ­
ual would have bargained for in the insurance market, absent market 
failures of various sorts. 
To apply this framework to the precise question at hand-whether 
to offset awards by savings or wealth-we need to ask, in effect, 
whether and to what extent individuals or households purchasing life 
insurance under conditions of high information, low transaction costs 
and relatively few cognitive biases, would decide to adopt wealth off­
sets on their own. Put differently, to what extent would or do life 
insurance purchasers treat their own or the household's wealth as a 
form of self-insurance against the loss of a wage earner? We can im­
agine, for example, that households with a great deal of wealth rela­
tive to income might only partially insure the human capital of a 
household earner (or, for the truly wealthy, not insure at all) , prefer­
ring instead to absorb the financial loss of an earner's income rather 
than to spend money on life insurance premiums. Thus, it is easy to 
imagine that Bill Gates, despite his enormous earning power, might 
not feel the need to purchase a term life policy. For such families, 
including savings as a collateral offset would make some sense, on 
grounds of consumer sovereignty, in the sense that the government­
provided life insurance would approximate the amount of life insur­
ance that the family would have purchased for itself. Along the same 
lines, we might suppose that households for whom human capital is 
the largest household asset would be less likely to self-insure, as there 
is too little wealth to absorb the loss, and thus such households would 
be more likely to prefer a policy that provides full replacement of 
human capital. For such households, an offset for savings would be 
contrary to consumer sovereignty. 
But these are mere speculations. Thus, the most obvious problem 
with a serious attempt to apply the consumer sovereignty principle in 
this way to the design of collateral source offsets for the Fund (or 
wherever such offsets are used) is - that we cannot know, without a 
great deal of empirical research into consumer behavior, whether indi­
viduals or households, when buying life insurance, implicitly or explic­
itly reduce the amount of coverage they purchase to account for their 
household wealth. It remains an open question as to what extent 
households, when insuring the human capital of household earners, 
tend to self-insure. But even if such data on consumer spending deci-
66. Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE 
L.J. 353. 355-59 ( 1988) (discussing the consumer sovereignty norm in contracts literature and 
applying it to products liability law). 
620 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:591 
sions were available, and even if the Special Master had wanted to 
adopt such a fine-tuned consumer-sovereignty approach, the effort 
would have been rendered almost impossible by the inherent difficul­
ties of modeling the "optimal" amount of life insurance, the amount 
that a "rational" household would purchase. Relatedly, given all of 
the reasons why households are believed to purchase too little life in­
surance on the private market (myopia, aversion to planning for their 
own death), empirical evidence of private life insurance purchases 
may be more misleading than informative. 
The biggest problem, though, facing collateral offsets for savings at 
least in the Fund context (especially, but not only, if such offsets were 
made for some claimants but not others) would have been the political 
one. As a political matter, collateral sources had to have a uniform 
meaning across all claimants, even if a fine-tuned life insurance con­
sumer-sovereignty approach would have called for some variation 
based on varying consumer preferences. And just as the Special 
Master came under enormous pressure from the representatives of the 
highest-income victims not to place an overall cap on awards, the po­
litical pressure not to adjust the awards downward based on wealth 
would have been immense. 
One might also have advocated savings or wealth offsets to Fund 
awards not on consumer sovereignty grounds-which is consistent 
with a "compensation based" view of the Fund-but on grounds of 
distributive justice, which is not. That is to say, if the Fund is under­
stood more as a type of ad hoc social insurance than as a substitute for 
the tort regime, making the awards needs-based rather than purely 
compensation-based is somewhat more defensible, at least as an initial 
matter. After all, the Social Security program-including the feder­
ally provided life insurance available through the Social Security Sur­
vivorship program-has an obvious needs-based element to the 
calculation of benefits. For example, if a qualified wage-earner in a 
household dies, the Social Security Survivorship benefits paid to the 
surviving spouse are reduced as the survivor's income rises above cer­
tain thresholds.67 Likewise, the earned income tax credit, beyond a 
67. Soc. SEc. ADMIN., Pue. No. 05-10069, How WORK AFFECTS YOUR BENEFITS (1999). In 
general, if the surviving spouse is under the age of 65, for every $2 he or she earns in excess of 
$9,600, $1 in survivorship benefits is lost. Id. at 2. 
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point, decreases as one earns more income;68 and many social welfare 
programs historically have been designed to be "means tested."69 
A distributive-justice or needs-based rationale for offsetting Fund 
awards with personal savings, however, would also have faced enor­
mous political opposition, for the reasons already mentioned. The 
rhetoric of full compensation, which is directly inconsistent with this 
needs-based approach, took hold fairly quickly after the September 
11th attacks, in part out of sympathy for the families, and in part, as 
mentioned, to make the Fund alternative an attractive alternative to 
tort law, and thus, to help stabilize the reeling airline companies. 
Moreover, the practical difficulties and associated administrative costs 
of applying a means-tested approach via the collateral-source offsets 
would have been enormous. If the September 11th Fund had been, 
instead of a one-time ad hoc system of compensation for a single 
event, a new ongoing social insurance program-a new form of gener­
ally available government-provided life insurance-means-testing of 
some sort would have been much more likely, not only in the collat­
eral-source offsets but in the size of the initial awards as well. But 
that, of course, is not what the Fund was designed to be. Rather, the 
Fund is a more or less one-time program to cover the losses arising 
out of a single event. If, however, events such as September 11th be­
come more routine, we would expect less generous benefits gener­
ally,70 but also a greater likelihood of wealth-adjusted collateral 
offsets, or something similar, although again we are speculating. 
In sum, although we agree with the Special Master's decision not to 
include savings or personal wealth in the definition of collateral 
sources for the Fund, a decision that seems also to be squarely within 
the intent of Congress, we believe that the case against a means-tested 
or need-based definition of collateral offsets is more complicated than 
has previously been recognized. And although the task of drawing the 
line between savings and insurance (and between charity and insur­
ance) may not always be easy, it is an inevitable byproduct of a com­
pensation-based approach. 
68. I.RC. § 32 (2000); see also, Ann L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limita­
tions of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533 (1995). 
69. Examples of such programs include, among many others, foodstamps, Section 8 housing 
subsidies, Medicaid, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (which replaced Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children) , and Social Security's Supplemental Security Income. 
70. See Levmore & Logue, supra note 58. 
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2. The Nonoffset/Subrogation Alternative Revisited: The Make­
Whole Issue and Delegating the Collateral Source Question 
Because of the inherent difficulty of defining collateral sources, 
there might have been a temptation in the design of the Fund to go 
with the nonoffset/subrogation alternative from traditional tort juris­
dictions. Again, this would not have been for deterrence or corrective 
justice reasons, but simply to avoid the difficulty of deciding what 
would be and what would not be considered a collateral source. How­
ever, the nonoffset/subrogation approach has its own problems of 
line-drawing. For example, the collateral-nonoffset approach would 
have required either Congress or the Special Master to identify the 
life insurance, or savings sources, or both, that would have been 
granted a subrogation right and under what circumstances. Here the 
critical decisions would · not only have been the identification of 
sources, but resolution of the difficult make-whole issue, discussed 
above,7 1 that often arises in the context of subrogation. One way of 
putting the make-whole question is this: Would a collateral source's 
subrogation right be automatic, or would it be applicable only to pre­
vent overcompensation? 
To see the importance of this question, consider a simple example. 
Suppose there are two identically situated households. Each is a fam­
ily of four, with two parents (both of whom are wage earners) and two 
small children; and the income and wealth levels of the two house­
holds, again, are the same. The only difference is that the two house­
holds carry different amounts of life insurance on the primary earners 
within the households. Household One carries a $1 million policy on 
the life of the primary earner, which we will assume would completely 
replace the insured's lost earning power. Household Two, however, 
with an identical earning potential, carries only a $20,000 policy on the 
primary earner, which, under our assumptions, would be substantially 
undercompensatory. 
Now consider the effects of giving the life insurers in this example a 
subrogation right . One can easily imagine concluding that granting 
Household One's life insurer a subrogation right would make perfect 
sense, because it would help to prevent overcompensation in circum­
stances involving multiple sources of recovery. However, this conclu­
sion works only because we have assumed adequate coverage in the 
first place. Recall that it was the general tendency to underinsure 
household wage-earners that served as the primary rationale for not 
71.  See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
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allowing subrogation of life insurance in the first place.72 If we con­
sider the case of the underinsured wage-earner, of which Household 
Two is an egregious example, we can see that granting the life insurer 
a subrogation right can contribute to, or at least fail to ameliorate, the 
undercompensation of the surviving members of the household. In 
such a situation, if there were some other source of recovery besides 
the $20,000 policy, the life insurer for Household Two could seek re­
imbursement first, before the surviving members of the family. 
It is a familiar fact of insurance law that this problem can be policed 
by a rule requiring that the claimant be made whole before any collat­
eral source could exercise its subrogation right. And such a rule 
would presumably have been necessary if Congress and the Special 
Master had taken the nonoffset/subrogation route. But a make-whole 
rule is no panacea. Enforcing such a rule would require some form of 
adjudication or at least some standard for determining the amount of 
the claimant's total "loss." The Special Master's rules seem to presup­
pose that he will pay all claimants their "full" economic and 
noneconomic losses, thus circumventing this issue. But this presuppo­
sition may prove to be questionable when he pays particular claims, 
and there is certainly no reason to believe that future compensation 
arrangements will always pay "full" losses. Consequently, whenever a 
collateral nonoffset approach is used, the conditions under which sub­
rogation by collateral sources is permitted will have to be addressed 
and the make-whole issue resolved. 
If Congress had decided to adopt the nonoffset approach, it might 
have been tempted to resolve the make-whole issue by avoiding or 
delegating it. That is to say, as an alternative to adopting a mandatory 
subrogation approach, Congress could have merely "authorized" life 
insurers, pension funds, and similar sources to insert subrogation 
rights into their policies or contracts and then left it to them and to the 
courts to decide what these subrogation provisions would mean. But 
then the job of deciding how to deal with the make-whole issue (and, 
as a result, what offsets to require or not to require) would fall to the 
insurers and the courts. Such a solution might have had some short­
run political benefits, as Congress and the Special Master would not 
have been directly responsible for answering the hard questions. 
However, the questions would not have been avoided altogether. 
Moreover, we cannot ignore the fact that life insurers have never 
found it in their interest to assert subrogation rights. This fact sug­
gests that life insurers would be unlikely to start inserting subrogation 
72. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
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clauses now, even if they are specifically authorized to do so by stat­
ute.73 Given this fact, we might view the collateral offsets for life in­
surance prescribed by the Fund as simply the federal government's 
way of taxing life insurers for part of the cost of September 11th com­
pensation, under circumstances in which the life insurers would have 
had to pay anyway under a nonoffset subrogation approach. 
The approach Congress adopted, of course, contains an element of 
unfairness for those families of victims who happened to have pur­
chased adequate life insurance. Why are they being punished for hav­
ing planned ahead? A solution to this concern might be to allow a 
collateral offset-offset for the amount of life insurance premiums that 
were paid by the September 11th victims or their families on the poli­
cies during the life of the policy, up to September 11th. For victims 
with outstanding life insurance policies, under this approach, it would 
be as if the federal government had been paying the premiums all 
along and thus were now, via the collateral offset, getting the benefit 
of their bargain. Even this solution, however, would not be perfect.74 
IV. CONCLUSION 
An important question raised by our analysis is whether the collat­
eral offset provision in the Fund creates a precedent that will have a 
broader impact on the future of personal injury and compensation 
law. That is certainly possible, perhaps even likely. We can easily im­
agine policymakers following the example of the Fund and adding 
broad collateral offsets that include life insurance to various existing 
compensation regimes or to new regimes that are adopted to respond 
to new sources of harm. Such a possibility provides the sense in which 
the genie may be out of the bottle: When a policy tool of this sort is 
used for the first time, especially in such a public manner, it is likely to 
be used again, at least in similar situations (such as future terror at­
tacks) and perhaps in situations involving other types of losses and 
other compensation regimes as well. 
There are, of course, sound reasons not to use the collateral offset 
approach in some settings, settings in which there is some realistic 
hope that the threat of tort liability can have a significant deterrent 
73. Given that no one currently has a subrogation clause, the reason for this phenomenon 
might be a version of the first-mover problem; no insurer would wan t  to be known as the first 
company to insert such a right in their policies. 
74. For example, there would be administrative costs with respect to outstanding life insur­
ance policies that involved some element of savings (that is, cash-value policies), as it would be 
necessary under this approach to distinguish the pure insurance portion of the premium from the 
portion that went to cash value. 
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effect. In such settings, a nonoffset approach, coupled with subroga­
tion, would make more sense, in which case, the question of defining 
collateral sources becomes moot (although the make-whole issue re­
mains). One of the main insights of our analysis, however, is that 
when deterrence is not an issue (or not the primary issue), and hence, 
the primary issue is how to provide adequate compensation, a collat­
eral offset approach may indeed make sense, but there will remain 
difficult and interesting questions. 
For example, is full compensation to be the exclusive norm in the 
compensation regime, or is there room for need-consciousness or 
means-testing in such an approach? The conventional wisdom has 
long been that issues of wealth redistribution are best handled exclu­
sively by the tax-and-transfer system and never through other com­
pensation systems, especially not the tort system; however, that 
conventional wisdom assumes that the tort system is primarily about 
deterrence; when the tort system is mainly about deterrence and in­
centives, introducing a redistributive role for tort law produces consid­
erable distortion. However, if the deterrence and corrective-functions 
are removed from tort law-via collateral offsets, say-then the ques­
tion of whether to pursue a need-based or redistributive approach 
gains new strength.75 Thus, a question that has not previously been 
addressed, and which our analysis suggests deserves some attention, is 
whether such tort jurisdictions that have adopted the collateral-offset 
approach should include some aspect of savings or wealth in their col­
lateral offsets. 
We do not take a position on that question here, although we sus­
pect that the administrative problems that such an innovation would 
entail would not justify the small improvement in distributional eq­
uity. Also, we should emphasize that the case for a needs-based ap­
proach is stronger in the Fund context, in which deterrence and 
corrective justice seem to be entirely irrelevant, than in the context of 
collateral-offset tort jurisdictions. In those jurisdictions, of course, 
there is still some, albeit reduced, deterrence and corrective-justice 
function served by tort law. Plaintiffs in those jurisdictions still bring 
75. See Kyle Logue & Ronen Avraham, Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal Rules, 
and Insurance, 56 TAx L. REV. 157, 196 (2003) (arguing that, if because of cognitive biases 
individuals ignore tort law and thus tort law has no deterrence significance, the redistributive 
role for tort law might be more easily defended). There is of course a good practical fairness 
argument for leaving all income or wealth redistribution to regimes that are relatively compre­
hensive. Comprehensiveness is one of the appeals of the tax-and-transfer regime, and the lack of 
comprehensiveness is one of the complaints against the tort system, as methods of reducing 
wealth or income inequality. Id. at 185-88. For a series of responses to this argument, see gener­
ally id. 
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tort suits and sometimes recover damages from tortfeasors. Why? 
One reason is the availability of tort damages that are not offset by 
collateral sources-namely, pain-and-suffering damages and punitive 
awards. Another is the expressive or symbolic function that individu­
als sometimes attribute to their "day in court." Our point here, then, 
is not that collateral-source tort jurisdictions should immediately 
adopt need-based tort awards; rather, our point is that, because the 
deterrence and corrective justice functions of tort law are reduced in 
those jurisdictions, the case for need-based tort awards (or the case 
for including wealth in the definition of collateral sources) is stronger 
than has previously been recognized. Though it is still not as strong as 
in the Fund context, in which deterrence is truly irrelevant. 
In any event, the adoption of the Fund has put these questions 
squarely on the policy table, and they are questions that will recur not 
only after any future terror attacks, but also in connection with any 
new compensation regime that we can imagine. By breaking new 
ground in its prescription of offsets from Fund compensation for life 
insurance benefits, the Fund puts at issue an entire area that has until 
now been off limits to debate. By placing the proper role of life insur­
ance recoveries at issue, the Fund has done what happens periodically 
in the tort and insurance systems. It has raised questions about the 
fundamental purposes we seek to achieve in providing compensation 
to the victims of personal injury and illness. 
